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Abstract 
 
We investigate whether quality of care differs between public and private hospitals in 
England using data on 3.8 million publicly-funded patients receiving 133 planned (non-
emergency) treatments in 393 public and 190 private hospital sites. Private hospitals treat 
patients with fewer comorbidities and past hospitalisations. Controlling for observed patient 
characteristics and treatment type, private hospitals have fewer emergency readmissions. But 
patients’ choice of hospital may influenced by their unobserved morbidity. After 
instrumenting the choice of hospital type by the difference in distances from the patient to the 
nearest public and the nearest private hospital, the effect of private ownership changes sign 
and is statistically insignificant. Similar results are obtained with coarsened exact matching. 
We also find no quality differences between hospitals specialising in planned treatments and 
other hospitals, nor between for-profit and not-for-profit private hospitals. Our results show 
the importance of controlling for unobserved patient heterogeneity when comparing quality 
of public and private hospitals.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Countries differ in the mix of public and private providers treating publicly-funded patients 
(Barros and Siciliani, 2011). For example, in the USA 60% of hospitals are private not-for-
profit, 20% are private for-profit, and 20% are public.  In France 60% of hospitals are private. 
In Germany 30% are public, 35% are private not-for-profit and 35% are for-profit hospitals. 
In the Netherlands, all hospitals are private. In the United Kingdom and Norway most 
hospitals are public. Overall an increasing proportion of publicly-funded patients are treated 
in private hospitals (Siciliani et al., 2017).  In England the proportion of publicly-funded 
patients treated by private providers increased from almost zero at the start of the 2000s to 
4.5% of all non-emergency treatments in 2013, and public health service expenditure on 
private sector providers has increased from £4bn in 2009 to £9bn in 2016.1   
 
Private hospitals have strong incentives to maximise profits since they keep any financial 
surplus. Public hospitals are generally restricted in the use of financial surpluses, which have 
to be either re-invested or returned to the funder. A key policy issue is whether particular 
types of hospital ownership should be encouraged (Pollock, 2004; Leys and Toft, 2015). This 
depends in part on how ownership and the profit motive affect quality. The economic theory 
highlights two key mechanisms, which work in opposite directions. Driven by their financial 
motive, private hospitals may have a stronger incentive to increase quality in order to attract 
more patients, which will increases profits if the revenue from additional patients exceeds 
their costs of treatment. But if demand is not responsive to quality, perhaps because quality is 
difficult for patients to observe, private hospitals may have a stronger incentive to skimp on 
quality (Brekke et al., 2014; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001; Sloan, 2000). Public hospitals may 
also attract more altruistic workers with a stronger preference for quality (Lakdawalla and 
Philipson, 2006).2  
  
We investigate empirically whether there are differences in quality between public and 
private hospitals treating publicly-funded patients in England who seek planned (non-
emergency) treatment. We use data on 3.8 million publicly-funded patients receiving one of 
                                                 
1 ‘NHS: How much does it spend on the private sector?’ http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-44043959 
[published: 08/05/18; last accessed: 18/05/18]. 
2 We provide a more formal analysis of these different mechanisms in Section 1.1.  
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133 types of planned treatment across 393 NHS and 190 private hospital sites between April 
2013 and February 2014. (We do not examine the effects of ownership on patients admitted 
as emergency as publicly-funded emergency patients are treated only in public hospitals.) We 
measure hospital quality for patients having planned treatments as the probability that they 
have a subsequent emergency readmission (in the same hospital or any other hospital in 
England) within 28 days.  
 
A key issue in the comparison of quality between public and private providers of planned 
care is that there may be unobserved differences in the morbidity of their patients. Patients 
choose their provider and their choices may be affected by their morbidity. Private providers 
may also have stronger incentives to avoid more severe and expensive patients and 
consequently may appear to provide better quality if there is no adequate adjustment for case-
mix. We include an extensive range of control variables in our analysis to capture morbidity 
(including the Elixhauser comorbidities, and previous emergency hospitalisations in the year 
prior to the planned hospital admission for each patient in our sample). We deal with 
unobserved heterogeneity in case-mix by using the difference between the distances from the 
patient’s residence to the nearest public and nearest private hospital as a strong instrument for 
choice of provider type.  
 
We find that private providers have lower unadjusted emergency readmission rates i.e. higher 
quality. But they also treat patients with fewer co-morbidities and past emergency 
hospitalisations. Even after controlling for observed case-mix, ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimates suggest that private hospitals have an emergency readmission rate which is one 
third smaller than the 2.3% rate of NHS hospitals. But instrumental variable (IV) estimates 
show that the choice of provider type is endogenous and, when this is allowed for, there is no 
difference in quality between public and private hospitals. We obtain similar results when we 
use OLS and instrumental variables models on a sample selected by coarsened exact 
matching.  We check the plausibility of our IV results using a test, suggested by Altonji et. al. 
(2005) and extended by Oster (2017), which is based on the changes in the OLS coefficient 
as observed confounders are included. The test suggests that the OLS estimate is indeed 
biased in favour of private hospitals, thereby supporting the results from our IV models. Our 
analyses suggest that controlling for a rich set of covariates is not sufficient by itself to 
adequately account for differences in case-mix between public and private providers.   
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Private providers can be for-profit or not-for-profit and the resulting differences in incentives 
might affect quality. We therefore also compare quality in public providers, private for-profit 
and private not-for-profit providers. Using differential distances between the three types of 
provider to instrument for the choice of provider type we again find that patient choice of 
provider type is endogenous.  After allowing for endogenous choice of provider there is no 
difference in quality across the three types of provider.   
 
Some providers, known as treatment centres, specialise in a limited set of planned treatment 
types (e.g. cataract surgery, hip and knee replacements) and do not treat any emergency 
patients. Since such specialisation could affect quality and most treatment centres are private, 
we also compare quality across four types of provider: public non-treatment centres, public 
treatment centres, private non-treatment centres and private treatment centres. After 
instrumenting for choice of provider type with differential distances, we find no difference 
between public non-treatment centres, private non-treatment centres, and private treatment 
centres but public treatment centres have higher emergency readmission rates compared to 
public non-treatment centres. However, there are only six public treatment centres in our 
sample, and their quality is not statistically different from that of private treatment centres. 
We conclude that not only is there no overall quality difference between public and private 
providers there is also no difference in quality between public and private providers of the 
same degree of specialisation 
 
We also examine if the effect of ownership varies by type of patient. Stratifying patients by 
observable morbidity makes no difference to our results: there is no difference in quality 
between private and public providers for high and low morbidity patients. When we split the 
sample by age or by deprivation, quality is higher in private providers for less deprived and 
younger patients. But for more deprived or older patients, quality is lower in private 
providers.  
 
Finally, we estimate separate models for different type of treatment and find that private 
providers have lower quality for non-diagnostic treatments and higher quality for diagnostic 
treatments. In four of the five non-diagnostic procedures (non-trauma knee, cataract, hernia, 
non-trauma hip) with the highest number of private patients, there is no difference in quality 
between private and public providers.  
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Our paper makes a number of contributions to the existing literature on the effect of hospital 
ownership on quality. First, we use data from a period in which public and private hospitals 
were paid the same prospective price for a given treatment. Our results are therefore not 
confounded by differences in payment rules, and hence different financial incentives, for 
different types of hospital.   
 
Second, most previous studies focus on quality of emergency care and use mortality as a 
measure of quality.  We examine quality of planned care which is as important as emergency 
care in terms of volume, and has been understudied in the literature. Since mortality is 
negligible for the types of planned care provided by private hospitals in England, and in other 
OECD countries with relatively small private sectors, we use hospital readmission rates as the 
quality measure. Emergency readmissions are widely used as a quality metric, for example by 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services in the US (Cox et al., 2016) and by the 
Department of Health in England.  
 
Third, we use data on 133 different planned treatments, whereas previous studies have 
usually examined quality differences for a small number of specific treatments.  This enables 
us to examine not only the overall effect of ownership on quality of planned hospital 
treatment, but also whether the effects of ownership differ across types of treatment.  
 
Fourth, in addition to the comparisons of public and private hospitals and public versus 
private for-profit versus private not-for-profit, we also examine whether public and private 
ownership has different effects for providers specialising in planned care.  
 
Fifth, most of the previous literature is from the US. Unlike the US, the private hospital 
sector in England is relatively small and within it for profit providers predominate. The 
institutional context is therefore quite different, and results from the US are unlikely to be 
applicable. Our results are relevant for other Beveridge health systems (e.g. Spain, Italy and 
Norway) where public purchasers have to decide the extent to which they contract out care to 
private providers.  
 
In the rest of this introductory section we provide, first, a theoretical model to explain why 
private hospitals could have higher or lower quality than public hospitals and, second, a short 
account of the mixed findings in the empirical literature. Section 2 describes the institutional 
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background and the data. Section 3 sets out the estimation strategy and Section 4 reports 
results. Section 5 concludes.  
 
1.1 Theory  
We provide a theory model to illustrate why the effect of ownership on quality is 
indeterminate. The model is a simplified version of Brekke et al. (2012). Since the focus is on 
ownership we assume that there is a single hospital choosing quality q and facing the demand 
function D(q) ( D> 0), which is increasing in quality.3  Profit is 
( ) [ ( )] ( ) ( )q p c q D q K q                           (1) 
where p is the fixed tariff paid by the funder, not by the patient. ( )c q (c > 0) is the unit cost 
of treating a patient and K(q) (K > 0) is the cost of investment in information technology, 
MRI scanners etc to improve quality. Hospital staff incur a non-monetary cost of effort ( )q (
  > 0). Hospitals are altruistic and care directly about quality.  Altruism is captured by 
( )ab q where a > 0 denotes the degree of altruism and ( )b q ( b  > 0) is patient benefit.  The 
hospital objective function is 
( ) ( ) ( )V q ab q q    ,                                                      (2) 
where δ is the weight that the hospital puts on profit.4 We expect that not-for-profit private 
providers, say owned by charities, will place a lower weight on profit than for-profit private 
providers. Public hospitals subject to a profit constraint, even if just a requirement to break 
even, will also place a positive, though possibly small, weight on profit.  
 
The hospital chooses quality q to satisfy  
* * * *( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0V q ab q q q        ,                                              (3) 
where     
* * * * * *( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )q p c q D q c q D q K q         .                       (4) 
Quality is chosen so that the marginal monetary and non-monetary benefits, from higher 
revenues and patients benefits, are equal to the marginal monetary and non-monetary costs. 
By the use of the implicit function theorem, and substituting for the marginal profit of quality 
from (3), we obtain the effect of the profit weight δ on quality: 
                                                 
3 The results of the theory model are qualitatively similar if hospitals instead compete on quality (see Brekke et 
al., 2012). 
4 For example  could be the weight on profit resulting from internal bargaining within the hospital amongst 
owners, managers, and medical staff or it could arise because the hospital must earn some minimum profit so 
that  is the Lagrange multiplier on profit which is larger the higher is the required minimum profit. 
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* * * * *
* * *
( ) / ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
q V q q q b q
V q V q V q
   
 
      
     
  
,            (5)                                            
with *( )V q  < 0 from the second order condition.   
 
Thus the effect of a greater weight on profit () on quality (q) is in general indeterminate: it 
will depend on the relative magnitudes of the derivatives of the provider monetary and non-
monetary cost function, and patient benefit function with respect to quality. It will also 
depend on the degree of altruism. In the absence of altruism and non-monetary costs, a 
greater weight on profit has no effect on quality (Lemma 1 of Brekke et al., 2012). If altruism 
is so high that marginal profit (q*) is negative (see (3)), a greater weight on profit reduces 
quality (Lemma 4 of Brekke et al., 2012).  If altruism is low, the marginal profit is positive 
(to offset the marginal effort cost) and a greater weight on profit leads the hospital to increase 
quality (Lemma 2 of Brekke et al., 2012).5  
 
In the more general model by Brekke et al. (2012) providers also choose cost-containment 
effort. In that scenario, a higher weight on profit gives stronger incentives to contain costs, 
which in turn reduces the marginal treatment costs and increases the price mark-up, therefore 
giving more profit orientated providers stronger incentives to compete on quality (Lemma 3 
of Brekke et al., 2012).  
 
In summary, even in simplified theory models the effect of ownership on quality is 
indeterminate, which further motivates our empirical analysis. 
 
1.2 Related Literature 
A systematic review of the US literature reports mixed results: whether for-profit (FP) 
hospitals provide higher quality, as measured by mortality rates and other adverse events, 
depends on the region, the data source and the period of analysis (Eggleston et al., 2008).  
For Australia, Jensen et al. (2009) control for endogenous selection by employing a sample of 
patients with their first heart attack (AMI) who are likely to have no or limited choice of 
provider. They find that private hospitals have lower unplanned readmission and mortality 
rates. Milcent (2005) investigates differences in AMI mortality rates between public and 
                                                 
5 Notice, by contrast, that the effect of greater altruism, at given weight on profit, is always to increase quality 
since 
* *( ) / ( ) 0V q a b q     .    
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private hospitals in France when public and private not-for-profit (NFP) hospitals were 
subject to a global budget and private for profit (FP) hospitals were paid by fee-for-service. 
After controlling for differences in severity, public hospitals and private NFP hospitals have 
similar outcomes, but private FP hospitals have lower mortality rates. Lien et al. (2008) 
instrument the choice between Taiwanese NFP and FP hospitals with differential distance. 
They find that NFP hospitals have better quality and lower mortality for stroke and cardiac 
treatment. When endogeneity is not taken into account the estimated effect of NFP status is 
halved.  
 
Picone et al. (2002) examine the effects of changes in ownership on quality. This approach 
allows for unobserved time-invariant provider effects but relies on covariates to control for 
casemix.  Shen (2002) also uses changes in ownership and argues that restricting the analysis 
to AMI patients reduces endogenous selection problems. Both studies find that mortality 
increased in hospitals that changed status from NFP to FP. 
 
For England, three studies compare public hospitals with private treatment centres during 
periods in which public and private providers faced different payment regimes. Browne et al. 
(2008) and Chard et al. (2011) do not allow for unobserved patient selection but do have 
condition specific pre and post-procedure health measures for five treatments.  Browne et al. 
(2008) find that patients in private treatment centres had greater improvements in functional 
status and quality of life for hip replacement but smaller improvements for hernia repair.  
Patients in private treatment centres had fewer post-operative complications for knee 
replacement, hernia repair and cataracts.  Chard et al. (2011) report that treatment centres had 
higher quality for hip and knee and similar quality for varicose vein and hernia surgery.  
Perotin et al. (2013) use a switching regression model to allow for endogenous choice of type 
of provider by patients having nine types of planned care in 2007. The effects of ownership 
varied across the nine treatment types and they found no overall difference in patient 
satisfaction between public hospitals and private treatment centres.  
 
2 Data 
2.1 Institutional Background 
The English National Health Service (NHS) is tax funded. There is a gatekeeping system: 
patients register with a general practice and must be referred to hospital for planned care by 
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their general practitioner (GP). Patients do not pay for healthcare other than a small charge 
for primary care prescriptions. Around 11% of the population have supplementary private 
healthcare insurance (King’s Fund, 2014). 
 
NHS patients can be treated in NHS hospitals or in the private sector, either in private general 
hospitals or in Independent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs) specialising in a limited set of 
procedures. Most private providers are for profit. There are also NHS treatment centres on 
NHS hospital sites (Bate et al., 2007). After the introduction of private sector treatment 
centres from 2002/3 and the relaxations of constraints on NHS patients’ choice of provider in 
2008 (Department of Health, 2007), there was a rapid increase in the proportion of NHS 
planned patients treated in private providers. As Figure 1 shows the proportion of all planned 
patients treated in private providers has increased from about 2% in 2006 to 4.5% in 2013.   
There was an even greater increase for some large volume planned procedure. The proportion 
of NHS funded planned hip replacements carried out in private providers in increased from 
3% in 2006 to 18% in 2011 (Arora et al., 2013).   
 
Both NHS and private sector hospitals treating NHS patients are subject to quality regulation 
and inspection by the Care Quality Commission which publishes reports and quality ratings. 
Information on hospital quality and characteristics is publicly available, for example on the 
NHS Choices website (www.nhs.uk).   
 
Hospitals are paid per NHS patient treated, with the tariff based on national average costs 
adjusted for local input prices (Department of Health, 2002). The tariff varies by healthcare 
resource groups (HRGs), the English version of diagnosis related groups. From 2009/10 
onwards all providers, whether public or private or general hospitals or treatment centres 
have been paid the same HRG tariff.6 The HRG prospective pricing regime ensures that 
providers which attract more patients by increasing quality will get more revenue. All types 
of provider also have direct financial incentives for quality of care for NHS patients 
(Meacock et al., 2014).  In particular, if a provider’s overall emergency readmission rate 
exceeds a benchmark agreed with the local NHS commissioning body they must bear the cost 
                                                 
6 ISTCs were initially encouraged to enter the market by being offered favourable contracts. The aim was to 
reduce waiting times in certain planned procedures such as ophthalmology and orthopaedics (House of 
Commons Health Select Committee, 2006; Cooper et al., 2016).   
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of the emergency readmissions above the threshold and are not paid for the index admissions 
(Department of Health, 2013).7  
 
 
Figure 1. Hospital admissions for all NHS-funded planned procedures 2006-2013.    
 
Notes. Authors’ computations. The graph shows the number all types of NHS-funded planned hospital 
admission.  
 
 
2.2 Data  
 
We use administrative data from Hospital Episodes Statistics (HES) for the financial year 
April 2013 to March 2014. HES includes information for all publicly-funded inpatient care 
provided by NHS and private hospitals in England.   
 
We measure hospital quality of planned treatment by whether the patient had a subsequent 
emergency readmission to hospital within 28 days of discharge from the index planned 
                                                 
7 Emergency readmissions for children under 4, maternity, childbirth, cancer and patients discharging against 
medical advice are excluded from the total readmission rate.    
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procedure.8  Emergency readmissions to hospitals are a widely used measure of quality in the 
clinical and health economics literatures (Ashton et al., 1997; Weissman et al., 1999; Balla et 
al., 2008; Billings et al., 2012; Blunt et al., 2014) and are also used by as performance 
indicators by policy makers in the English NHS (Department of Health, 2011, 2012) and in 
the USA (Rosenthal, 2007). We follow NHS performance indicator methodology (HSCIC, 
2013) and define emergency readmissions to exclude readmissions for repeated planned 
treatments such as cancer, chemotherapy, haemodialysis. We differ in including patients with 
an index planned day-case admission (82.5% of our sample) since, although the emergency 
readmission rate is less than for cases with a planned overnight stay, it is not negligible. We 
include a day case indicator in the readmission models to control for this (Table A4).  
 
Most NHS and private organisations which provide hospital services are multi-site. We use 
the HES hospital identifier code to classify hospital sites as belonging to a public (NHS) or 
private organisation.  We also further distinguish in some models between treatment centres 
and general providers using information provided by the NHS Digital Organisation Data 
Service.9,10 We assigned for-profit/not-for-profit status to private providers using the 
Companies House register and supplementary web searches.   
 
HRGs are assigned to admissions via the Reference Costs Grouper tool.11 The HRG 
alphanumeric code has five characters, of which the first four, known as HRG root, define a 
given procedure or diagnosis (e.g. the code FZ18 is used for ‘Inguinal, Umbilical or Femoral 
Hernia Procedures’), and the last character is a HRG-specific split used to differentiate by 
patient age,  or by clinical severity based on complications, or by both.  We use the four digit 
HRG root codes without the split to classify index planned admissions by procedure.12 We 
only include HRGs which carry a risk of harm to the patient, whether the HRG is curative 
                                                 
8 We follow international usage and apply the term “planned” to all three of the admission types that HES labels 
as elective (“where the decision to admit could be separated in time from the actual admission”). Maternity 
cases are excluded. 
9 See https://digital.nhs.uk/organisation-data-service/data-downloads/other-nhs for data on NHS hospital sites 
and https://digital.nhs.uk/organisation-data-service/data-downloads/non-nhs for data on private hospital sites. 
10 Unlike the US, most English private hospitals are owned by for-profit organizations. Out of 25 private 
organizations in our sample, only 6 are not-for-profit, and they treat just 11% of the private patients in our 
sample (1.21% of the entire sample). We therefore do not distinguish between for-profit and not-for-profit 
private providers in our main analysis. 
11 http://content.digital.nhs.uk/article/6226/HRG4-201415-Reference-Cost-Grouper?tabid=3 . 
12 We do not use the 5th character of the HRG code because some of the complications covered by it may result 
from poorer quality hospital care, and hospitals may also upcode patients as the tariff is higher for more 
complex cases (Doyle et al., 2017). We do not lose any useful information on morbidity contained in the 5 th 
character as we include both age and pre-existing comorbidities in the covariates. 
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(e.g. hip replacments) or diagnostic. Thus we include invasive diagnostic procedures, such as 
colonoscopy, but not non-invasive X-rays or magnetic resonance imaging.  
     
We further restrict the sample to NHS funded patients13 where the index planned treatment 
(HRG) was carried out at least 30 times in each of four types of provider (NHS non-treatment 
centre, NHS treatment centre, private non-treatment centre, ISTC) in 2013. (Appendix Table 
A1 shows the distribution of hospital sites and patients by type of hospital, while Appendix 
Table A2 reports the number of public and private hospitals which offered each HRG 
treatment in year 2013/14).  Our main estimation sample is 3,784,683 admissions for planned 
treatments in 133 HRGs. 9.96% of the admissions were to private providers.  
 
To control for case-mix we include, in addition to patient age and gender, the number of 
Elixhauser comorbidities (Elixhauser et al., 1998), and the number of emergency 
hospitalisations in the year before the index admission. We also control for the quality of 
primary care provided by the patient’s general practice with a composite quality measure 
based on the practice’s 2012 performance on 42 clinical indicators from the Quality and 
Outcomes Framework (Doran et al., 2006).  
 
We classify patients as living in a rural or urban area by the Office of National Statistics 
rurality classification of their Lower Super Output Area (LSOA)14 of residence. We attribute 
a measure of LSOA income deprivation based on the 2010 Indices of Multiple Deprivation 
(McLennan et al., 2011) to patients. 
 
Hospital locations are derived from their postcodes. We compute straight-line distances from 
the centroid of each patient’s LSOA of residence to all hospitals providing NHS-funded 
planned hospital care in 2013/14. The distances are HRG-specific, so that, for example, the 
distances for hernia surgery patients (HRG root FZ18) are computed only to hospital sites 
performing hernia surgery.  
  
                                                 
13 There is no publicly available detailed data for privately funded patients in private providers.   
14 There were 32,482 LSOAs in England defined by 2001 Census boundaries. LSOAs have a mean population 
of 1,500 and are created to be homogeneous with respect to tenure and accommodation type.  The rural category 
includes areas classified as town and fringe, village, hamlet and isolated dwellings, while the urban category 
consists only of urban areas. See ONS (2004) for details. 
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3 Methods 
3.1 Model specification 
Our baseline specification for the effect of private ownership on hospital quality of planned 
care is the linear probability model 
 
ij j i i i j i i i iy H H               X β Xβ ,   (6) 
where yij is an indicator equal to one if patient i with a planned admission for treatment j is 
readmitted to any hospital as an emergency within 28 days of the discharge date of the index 
admission. Hi  is an indicator equal to 1 if the index hospital is privately-owned;  αj  is the 
fixed effect for HRG j.  Xi is a vector of patient characteristics.  i  is unobserved severity and 
νi is an i.i.d error. We use heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at HRG root 
level when estimating (6). 
 
Xi includes controls for patient age (in 20-year bands), gender, number of Elixhauser co-
morbidities, number of emergency hospitalizations in the previous year, whether the patient 
lives in a rural area, was admitted as a day case, patient LSOA income deprivation, and the 
patient’s GP practice quality score in 2012.  Xi also includes the distance from the centroid of 
i’s LSOA of residence to the nearest A&E department to allow for the possibility that if i 
feels unwell after her discharge from the index planned treatment, her decision to visit an 
A&E department, and hence possibly to be admitted as an emergency patient, will depend on 
her distance to the A&E department. 
 
The coefficient of interest is : the difference in the probability of an emergency readmission 
following a planned treatment in a private hospital compared to an NHS hospital.  There is 
higher quality of care in private hospitals if  < 0.  
 
Privately-owned hospitals in England treat NHS patients of lower observed severity for a 
given condition (Browne et al. 2008, Chard et al., 2011; Mason et al. 2010). Selection on 
observed severity suggests that there may also be selection on unobserved severity ( )i  so that 
Cov(Hi,i |αj,Xi)  0 and the OLS estimate of   is biased. Quality affects patients’ choice of 
provider for planned care (Beckert et al. 2012, Gaynor et al. 2016, Gutacker et al. 2016, 
Moscelli et al. 2016a). If patient preferences over quality vary with their unobserved 
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morbidity and they believe that public and private providers have different quality, then there 
may bias due to unobserved selection.   
 
To remove selection bias we use two stage least squares (2SLS).  The first stage linear 
regression for provider type is  
 
i j ij i iH D     X γ ,  (7) 
where 𝜆j and Xi are respectively the HRG effects and the case-mix adjusters and i is a zero 
mean error term uncorrelated with the explanatories. The instrument Dij is the difference 
between the distance from the centroid of the patient’s LSOA to the nearest NHS provider of 
treatment j and the distance to the nearest private provider of treatment j. We use robust 
standard errors clustered on HRGs for the first and second stage regressions.15 
 
Differential distance has been used as an instrument in the literature on the effectiveness of 
healthcare treatments (McClellan et al., 1994; Newhouse and McClellan, 1998) and the effect 
of hospital ownership on quality (Sloan et al., 2001; Shen, 2002; Lien, 2008). Results from 
our first stage model show that it is indeed a strong predictor of the type of hospital at which 
a patient is treated.   
 
For our IV strategy to work, the instrument should affect the second stage outcome 
(emergency readmission) only indirectly through hospital type.  There are good reasons to 
believe that this untestable assumption holds.  First, differential distances are unlikely to have 
a direct effect on the probability of an emergency readmission. NHS patients are admitted as 
emergencies only to NHS hospitals. Distances to NHS hospitals may affect the probability 
that a patient, who is unsure if their symptoms indicate a condition requiring emergency 
hospital treatment, will present at the A&E department.  We therefore include the distance 
from the patient’s LSOA to the closest NHS site with an A&E department as a covariate in Xi 
in both the emergency readmission model (6), whether estimated by OLS or 2SLS, and in the 
first stage selection model (7). The distance to private hospitals, which do not provide 
emergency care to NHS patients, will not affect the probability of an emergency admission to 
an NHS hospital.  Thus, conditional on the distance to the nearest NHS A&E department, the 
difference between the distances to the nearest NHS site and to the nearest private site, should 
not affect the decision to seek emergency care.   
                                                 
15 The 2SLS models are estimated in Stata 13 using the ivreg2 user written function (Baum et al., 2007). 
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Second, it seems implausible that quality of planned care affects patients’ decisions about 
where to live.16 This would require prospective patients to predict the kind of planned 
treatments that they would require in the medium-to-long term and the future quality of care 
at different providers for these different treatments.17 Quality of care varies over time and is 
weakly correlated across different planned treatments within hospitals (Gravelle et al., 2014; 
Moscelli et al., 2016b).  Third, even if sicker patients might wish to locate near NHS 
hospitals with good quality emergency care (we know of no evidence for this), the qualities 
of emergency and planned hospital care are also weakly correlated (Gravelle et al., 2014; 
Moscelli et al., 2016b; Skellern, 2017). Fourth, we require only that the differential distance 
instrument is weakly exogenous, i.e. uncorrelated with the errors in the second stage 
readmission model conditional on the rich set of controls and HRG effects (𝜆j and Xi) 
included in the readmission model.18 
 
Some unobserved selection might arise from provider choice of patient. This may be 
unofficial and uncontracted for or it may be explicit and agreed with local NHS 
commissioners of care.  Some contracts for private treatment centres specify grounds on 
which they can refuse to treat a referred NHS patient (Cooper et al., 2016; Mason et al. 
2008).19 The observed morbidity measures included in Xi will allow for some provider 
selection of patients but some unobserved (by the researcher) selection by providers may 
                                                 
16 The treatments in our sample do not require patients to attend hospital repeatedly. We do not include patients 
with conditions like cancer or renal failure who may require many planned hospital admissions and so be more 
likely to locate near NHS providers.  Such patients are also dropped when official emergency readmissions 
performance indicators for NHS providers are computed:  
https://indicators.ic.nhs.uk/download/NCHOD/Specification/Spec_33D_533ISP4CPP1_12_V1.pdf  
17 It seems unlikely that patients getting one-off non-emergency treatments like hip and knee replacement will 
change their residence to be near their chosen hospital for an unanticipated planned procedure.  The waits for 
most one-off planned procedures are shorter than the number of days to sell a house in UK (96 days on average, 
according to http://corporate.postoffice.co.uk/our-media-centre#/pressreleases/rate-of-sale-the-average-uk-
property-takes-96-days-to-sell-2282828). 
18 We show in Appendix Tables A3 and A4 that the differential distance IV is not correlated with the main 
covariates measuring patient severity (number of past emergency admissions and the sum of Elixhauser 
comorbidities), thus suggesting that differential distance IV is unlikely to be correlated with unobserved 
morbidity.       
19 For example, a tender for treatments by private treatment centres of patients of five Clinical Commissioning 
Groups in south west England specifies that the provider can exclude patients who had a Body Mass Index of 
over 40 or who require a general anaesthetic and have a severe systemic disease that is a risk to life, for example 
unstable angina, or a recent myocardial infarction.  
20 See  https://www.bristolccg.nhs.uk/media/medialibrary/2015/10/govbody_28april2015_item10_1.pdf. These 
variables were much more heavily right skewed in NHS hospitals than in private hospitals, so that using a 
category of more than four comorbidities or previous admissions would match private patients to public patients 
with much higher mean counts. Using finer categories (e.g. 5 comorbidities, 6 comorbidities, etc…) would 
result in fewer matches.     
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remain.  The greater the degree of such cream skimming the weaker will be our differential 
distance instrument. If our first stage results show that the instrument is not weak and the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test rejects the null of exogeneity of type of provider, then we know 
that there has been unobserved selection of providers by patients.  Comparison of the OLS 
and 2SLS coefficients on provider type will show whether, as we expect, unobservably sicker 
patients are more likely to choose public hospitals.  The 2SLS estimate of the effect of private 
ownership may still be biased by unobserved patient selection by provider. However, we 
know the direction of this bias: provider selection of patients leaves private providers with 
unobservably healthier patients, and so will lead to an over-estimate of the quality gain from 
private treatment compared to public treatment.  Thus, if our second stage estimates show 
that private providers are no better than public providers, we can reasonably conclude that 
public providers have at least as high quality as private providers. 
 
3.2 Matching  
Regression adjustment for observable case-mix differences between private and public 
hospitals may not be adequate in the presence of non-linearities or interaction effects, even if 
there is no unobserved selection. If private providers treat observably less severe patients, the 
lack of common support may bias estimates of the effect of ownership even in the absence of 
unobserved selection (Heckman et al., 1997).   
 
We therefore use coarsened exact matching (CEM) (Blackwell et al., 2009; Iacus et al., 
2011) as a robustness check. We match each patient treated by a private provider to one or 
more patients treated in public hospital and who have the same gender, age band, number of 
past year’s emergency hospitalizations, number of Elixhauser comorbidities, quintile of the 
IMD 2010 income score, and the same HRG4 root code. We drop observations where the 
number of past year’s emergency hospitalizations and the number of Elixhauser 
comorbidities exceed 4. 20 We then estimate the OLS and 2SLS models using weights 
provided by the CEM algorithm.  
 
                                                 
20 See  https://www.bristolccg.nhs.uk/media/medialibrary/2015/10/govbody_28april2015_item10_1.pdf. These 
variables were much more heavily right skewed in NHS hospitals than in private hospitals, so that using a 
category of more than four comorbidities or previous admissions would match private patients to public patients 
with much higher mean counts. Using finer categories (e.g. 5 comorbidities, 6 comorbidities, etc…) would 
result in fewer matches.     
17 
 
3.3 Selection on unobservables and coefficient stability 
Another possible way to identify the direction of the possible omitted variables bias in our 
coefficient of interest δ (the effect of private ownership on emergency readmissions) is to use 
the change in the estimate of δ when observables are added to the regression (Altonji et al., 
2005; Oster, 2017).  Oster (2017) shows that, under certain assumptions,  
 
* maxR R
R R
   

     
o
o
  (8) 
converges asymptotically to the true parameter δ.   Here δo is the OLS estimate of   using 
only a minimal set of covariates (the HRG dummies αj), and Ro is the R-squared of this 
regression;    is the estimate of δ from the OLS regression using the full set of available 
explanatories (HRG dummies and the additional controls X) and R  is the R-squared from 
this regression; finally, maxR  is the assumed maximum R-squared achievable from the 
hypothetical OLS regression of y on the private provider indicator H, the HRG dummies, the 
controls X and on unobserved morbidity.   The assumptions required for δ* to be a consistent 
estimate of δ differ from those required for the IV strategy and we estimate *  under 
alternative assumptions about maxR to check that the direction of the omitted variable bias is 
consistent with our 2SLS results. 
 
3.4 Specialist vs general and for profit vs not for profit hospitals 
Treatment centres, which are mainly in the private sector, specialise in a small number of 
treatment types.  Whereas nearly half (46.4%) of patients in private hospitals receives care in 
treatment centres, only 1.4% of patients in public hospitals do so. Since specialisation in 
planned care may affect quality we estimate models which distinguish hospitals by whether 
they are treatment centres as well as by ownership  
                                                     
ij j i i iy      H δ X β  ,       (9) 
where Hi is a vector of three indicators for the patient having an admission to an NHS 
treatment centre, a private non-treatment centre, or a private treatment centre. The reference 
type of hospital is an NHS general hospital (non-treatment centre). For the 2SLS specification 
we estimate three first stage regressions for choice of an NHS treatment centre, private non-
treatment centre hospital, and private treatment centre.  
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The instruments in each first stage model are the three differential distances between the 
closest NHS general hospital and the distances to each of the three other hospital types. 
Notice that, as in our main specification, the three differential distances vary by HRG and this 
allows for the fact that treatment centres do not offer the entire spectrum of planned care. 21  
    
Some of the private hospitals treating NHS patients are for profit (FP) and some are not for 
profit (NFP) and previous studies in other healthcare systems have found that FP hospitals 
have lower quality (Sloan et al., 2001; Picone et al., 2002; Shen, 2002; Lien et al., 2008).  
We therefore examine whether the FP status of private hospitals affects quality for the NHS 
patients they treat.  We estimate a model similar to (9) in which public hospitals are the 
reference category and the alternatives are private NFP and private FP.   
 
3.5 Stratification by patient and procedure 
We also estimate models on subsamples defined by patient characteristics.  By dichotomising 
the sample by morbidity, for example, we can investigate whether there is more evidence of 
unobserved selection for high or low morbidity patients and whether the effect of ownership 
differs by morbidity.   To investigate whether the effect of ownership is procedure specific 
we estimate separate models for diagnostic and non-diagnostic procedures and also estimate 
procedure specific models for the 15 procedures with the largest number of patients treated in 
private providers.  
 
4 Results 
4.1 Summary statistics 
Table 1 has summary statistics by type of chosen hospital (NHS or private). Panel A is for 
the full estimation sample. Although NHS and privately treated patients have similar mean 
age and gender, NHS treated patients had more emergency hospitalisations (0.25 vs 0.10) in 
the previous year, come from slightly more income-deprived (mean IMD-income score of 
0.15 vs 0.13) and less rural small areas (18% vs 21%), and are more frequently treated as a 
day-case. They have similar numbers of Elixhauser comorbidities and GP quality scores. 
NHS treated patients are on average located closer to the nearest NHS hospital site with an 
A&E department than patients in private hospitals, and are more likely (2.26% vs 1.38%) to 
undergo an emergency readmission to hospital within 28 days of discharge from the index 
                                                 
21 We could alternatively restrict the sample to the small number of HRGs in which treatment centres specialise. 
This would lead to similar results since we include HRG fixed effects in Equation (9).  
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admission. Notice that for patients in an NHS hospital the distance to the nearest NHS 
hospital is smaller than the distance to the nearest private provider and vice versa for patients 
in private providers.  
 
Table 1. Patient descriptive statistics.  
Panel A. Unmatched sample 
 
NHS  Private 
  mean sd median  mean sd median 
28-days Emergency Readmission 0.0226 0.15 0  0.0138 0.12 0 
        
Female Patient 0.545 0.50 1  0.551 0.50 1 
Age 55.96 20.28 59  56.18 16.98 57 
Emergency Hospitalizations Past Year 0.25 0.76 0  0.10 0.42 0 
Elixhauser comorbidities 0.68 0.97 0  0.67 0.89 0 
IMD 2010 income score 0.15 0.11 0.11  0.13 0.10 0.09 
GP QOF 2012 79.02 3.69 79.31  79.11 3.63 79.40 
Rural patient 0.184 0.39 0  0.214 0.41 0 
Daycase patient 0.854 0.35 1  0.697 0.46 1 
Distance to closest NHS non-TC hospital site (km) 6.82 6.38 4.65  7.81 6.92 5.54 
        
dNHS: Distance to closest NHS site (non-TC or TC) 6.77 6.32 4.64  7.78 6.90 5.53 
dP: Distance to closest Private site (non-TC or TC) 17.37 21.73 10.22  8.60 7.85 6.31 
dNHS - dP -10.61 20.72 -3.72  -0.82 7.16 -0.15 
N 3,407,820  376,863 
Panel B. Matched sample 
 
NHS  Private 
  mean sd median  mean sd median 
28-days Emergency Readmission 0.0202 0.14 0  0.0137 0.12 0 
        
Female Patient 0.550 0.50 1  0.551 0.50 1 
Age 56.39 17.15 57  56.18 16.96 57 
Emergency Hospitalizations Past Year 0.10 0.45 0  0.09 0.41 0 
Elixhauser comorbidities 0.67 0.89 0  0.67 0.89 0 
IMD 2010 income score 0.13 0.10 0.09  0.13 0.10 0.09 
GP QOF 2012 79.04 3.64 79.32  79.11 3.63 79.40 
Rural patient 0.205 0.4 0  0.214 0.41 0 
Daycase patient 0.776 0.42 1  0.697 0.46 1 
Distance to closest NHS non-TC site 7.14 6.54 4.95  7.80 6.92 5.54 
        
dNHS: Distance to closest NHS site (non-TC or TC) 7.08 6.49 4.92  7.78 6.89 5.53 
dP: Distance to closest Private site (non-TC or TC)   15.18 18.17 9.64  8.59 7.84 6.30 
dNHS - dP -8.10 17.08 -2.79  -0.82 7.16 -0.14 
N  3,105,647   375,526 
Notes. Patients in matched sample in Panel B are matched using a Coarsened Exact Matching algorithm based 
on the variables in italics, together with the 133 four digit HRG4 codes. Statistics in Panel B are computed using 
the CEM weights. Number of hospital sites: 148 private non-TC, 42 private TC, 387 NHS non-TC, 6 NHS TC. 
TC: treatment centre. 
20 
 
Panel B has descriptive statistics on the matched sample, after reweighting using the CEM 
algorithm weights.22 Matching greatly reduces the imbalance in covariates between the two 
patient groups. There also is a slight reduction in the unconditional probability of emergency 
readmissions after treatment for NHS patients because of the exclusion of NHS-treated 
patients with high severity who could not be matched to private sector patients.      
 
4.2 Estimation results 
Table 2 summarises the key results for the unmatched sample from OLS and 2SLS models of 
the effect on the probability of an emergency readmission of being treated in a private 
hospital.  The full results, reported in the Appendix (Table A5), have plausible effects of the 
covariates: emergency readmission is more likely for older patients, those with more 
comorbidities, with more emergency admissions in the previous year, and living in a small 
area with higher income deprivation. Day-case patients are less likely to have an emergency 
readmission, suggesting that providers do have better information than is available in the 
HES data and are more likely to treat a patient as a day-case rather than an overnight stay if 
they are unobservably (by the researcher) healthier. Patients belonging to general practices 
with higher quality also have lower readmission rates.  Patients living further from the nearest 
general NHS hospital have lower emergency readmission probabilities, whether treated in a 
private or public provider.  Patients in rural areas are also less likely to have an emergency 
readmission, perhaps reflecting the effects of travel costs not fully captured by the straight 
line distance to the nearest NHS general hospital.  
 
In Table 2 the OLS estimate of the effect of private ownership after controlling for HRG type 
but not covariates is 0.0095 (column 1). Controlling for observed case-mix (column 2) 
reduces the estimated private ownership effect to 0.0070, which implies that patients treated 
in private providers have a one third lower emergency readmissions risk.   
 
The estimates of the effect of ownership change markedly when we instrument for choice of 
provider type (column 3). The first stage regression results in the lower part of the table show 
that the probability of choosing a private provider is higher the greater the difference in 
distance from the patient to the closest NHS hospital site and to the closest private hospital 
site.  The first stage F-statistic on the instrument is 48.70, which is comfortably larger than 
                                                 
22 Only about 1,300 out of 295,000 patients excluded by the matching algorithm were treated in private 
hospitals. 
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the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical value of 16.38 for a type-1 error of 5% and a maximum 
10% relative bias with respect to OLS. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Durbin, 1954; Wu, 
1973; Hausman, 1978) rejects the null hypothesis that hospital ownership is exogenous 
(p<0.001).  
  
The second stage estimate of the effect of being treated by a private hospital on the 
probability of an emergency readmission is positive and statistically insignificant, whereas 
the OLS estimate was negative and statistically significant. Moreover, the 99% confidence 
interval around the 2SLS estimate of  is [-0.0028; 0.0085], which does not include the OLS 
estimate. 
 
Table 2. Effect of ownership on emergency readmissions.  
  Emergency 
Readmission 
Emergency 
Readmission 
Emergency 
Readmission 
Emergency 
Readmission 
Emergency 
Readmission 
Emergency 
Readmission 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  OLS with 
HRGs only 
OLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  
Private  -0.0095*** -0.0070*** 0.0028 0.0028 0.0044 0.0030 
  (-8.9607) (-7.3660) (1.2956) (1.2935) (0.8286) (0.6589) 
       R2 0.0129 0.0303 0.0299 0.0299 0.0298 0.0299 
IV 1st stage choice of provider 
   Private Private Private Private 
    (3) (4) (5) (6) 
dNHS  dP   0.0021***       
      (6.9783)       
dNHS       0.0060***     
        (5.6921)     
dP       -0.0021***     
        (-6.9979)     
(dNHS  dP)/min{dNHS,dP}      0.0009***   
          (7.3771)   
dNHS/ min{dNHS,dP}        0.0029*** 
            (9.6772) 
dP/ min{dNHS,dP}           -0.0008*** 
         (-7.2841) 
1st stage F-stat 48.70 29.50 54.42 61.21 
Endogeneity Test Chi2 10.95 10.96 3.84 4.07 
Endogeneity Test p-value 0.0009 0.0009 0.0501 0.0436 
Sargan-Hansen Overidentif. Test Chi2   0.0058  0.2936 
Sargan-Hansen Test p-value  0.9392  0.5879 
Patients 3,784,683 3,784,683 3,784,683 3,784,683 
HRGs 133 133 133 133 
Notes. dNHS: procedure specific patient distance to nearest NHS hospital, dP: procedure specific patient distance 
to nearest private hospital. All models include 133 HRG effects and all except model (1) include age in bands 
(0-20/21-40/41-60/61-80/over 80), gender, number of Elixhauser comorbidities, number of emergency hospital 
admissions in the previous year, quality of patient’s GP in 2012, rurality and IMD income deprivation score of 
LSOA of patient’s residence, indicator for day-case patients, distance from the centroid of patient’s residence 
LSOA to the closest general NHS hospital. t-stats in parenthesis based on cluster-robust standard errors at HRG 
level; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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We obtain similar 2SLS results when the instruments are the distances to the nearest NHS 
and nearest private hospital (column 4), the proportional differential distance (column 5), and 
the proportional distances to the nearest NHS and nearest private hospital (column 6).23 The 
2SLS estimates of the effect of private ownership on probability of emergency admission 
range from 0.0028 to 0.0044 and are all statistically insignificant. 
 
The results in Table 3 are from models estimated on the matched sample. OLS and 2SLS 
results are very similar to those estimated on the unmatched sample: the OLS estimates 
suggest a large and statistically significant reduction in readmission risk for patients in 
private provides but the 2SLS estimates indicate a higher, though statistically significant risk, 
for patients in private providers. The first stage F-statistic on the excluded instrument 
(differential distance) is very large (240). The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test rejects the null of the 
exogeneity of hospital type (p = 0.004) and the OLS estimated effect is outside the 2SLS 99% 
confidence interval [0.0038, 0.0092].  
 
Table 3. Effect of ownership on quality, matched sample. 
  Emergency 
Readmission 
Emergency 
Readmission 
Emergency 
Readmission 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  OLS with HRGs 
& no case-mix 
controls 
OLS with HRGs 
& case-mix 
controls 
2SLS with HRGs 
& case-mix 
controls 
Private  -0.0066*** -0.0072*** 0.0027 
 (-6.8278) (-7.6404) (1.0739) 
R2 0.0120 0.0197 0.0192 
IV 1st stage choice of provider 
   Private 
dNHS  dP   0.0030*** 
1st stage F-stat   239.9045 
Endogeneity Test Chi2   8.2524 
Endogeneity Test p-value     0.0041 
Patients 3,481,173 3,481,173 3,481,173 
Number of HRGs 133 133 133 
Notes. Sample selected by Coarsened Exact Matching.  dNHS patient distance to nearest NHS hospital. dP 
distance to nearest private hospital. Controls and HRG effects as for Table 2 columns (2) and (3). t-stats in 
parenthesis based on cluster-robust standard errors at HRG level; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Table 4 shows the effect of treatment by a private hospital estimated using the Oster (2017) 
procedure under different assumptions about the achievable maximum R-squared achievable 
                                                 
23 With two distance-based instruments, either absolute (column (4)) or proportionate (column (6)), the Sargan-
Hansen (Sargan, 1958; Hansen, 1982) over-identification test fails to reject the validity of the IVs.   
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if all covariates, observed and unobserved, are used (see (6)). The results are consistent with 
the 2SLS results in Tables 2 and 3. As Rmax increases, the effect of private hospital treatment 
becomes less negative and then positive, suggesting that the OLS estimates are biased in 
favour of private providers.    
 
Table 4. Selection on unobservables and coefficient stability. 
  Rmax= 0.05 Rmax = 0.10 Rmax = 0.15 Rmax = 0.20 
Estimated effect private (δ*) -0.0057 -0.0016 0.0039 0.0116 
t-stat (-22.5365) (-4.0673) (6.7144) (12.0594) 
95% CI Lower Bound -0.0062 -0.0023 0.0028 0.0097 
95% CI Upper Bound -0.0052 -0.0008 0.005 0.0134 
Notes. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 500 replications.           
 
Table 5 compares private non-treatment centres, private treatment centre, and NHS treatment 
centres against NHS non-treatment centres.  The OLS model suggests that quality is higher 
for patients in both types of private providers compared with NHS non-treatment centres. 
There is also a small reduction in readmission probability (−0.0014) in NHS treatment 
centres, though the coefficient is statistically significant only at 10%.  The Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test rejects the null of exogeneity of the hospital types at 5%.  
 
Compared to OLS, the 2SLS coefficient on private non-treatment centre is greatly reduced (to 
−0.0005) and statistically insignificant. The coefficient on private treatment centre type 
changes sign to positive and is also statistically insignificant. The coefficient on the NHS 
treatment centre indicator also changes sign and suggests an increase in the emergency 
readmission probability of 0.018 compared with NHS non-treatment centres. Since the 
overall NHS mean readmission probability is 0.026, the effect of NHS non-treatment centres 
seems very large. However, we cannot reject at the 5% level the null hypothesis that the 
2SLS estimates of the effects of NHS treatment centres and private treatment centres on 
readmissions are equal.  Nor can we reject the null that the effects of private providers (both 
private ISTC and private non-TC) and NHS treatment centres are equal to zero. 
 
As there are only six NHS TCs and they may not be properly captured in Hospital Episode 
Statistics, we re-ran the models after combining NHS TCs and NHS non-TCs into a single 
NHS type. The OLS and 2SLS results (Appendix Table A6) for private non-TCs are similar 
to those in Table 4.  For the private TCs, the 2SLS results indicate a lower quality than NHS 
hospitals. However, we cannot reject at the 5% level the null that the quality of private 
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treatment centres and private non-treatment centres are equal to each other and to the baseline 
NHS type.   
 
Table 5. Effect of ownership and specialization on emergency readmission probability. 
Notes. Covariates, HRG effects, and sample size as in Table 2, columns (2) and (3).  dNHSnonTC patient distance to 
nearest NHS non TC, dPnonTC  patient distance to nearest private non TC, dNHSTC patient distance to nearest NHS 
TC. All distances procedure specific.   t-stats in parenthesis based on cluster-robust standard errors at HRGs 
level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
Table 6 compares FP and NFP private providers with NHS providers.24  The OLS estimates 
suggest that both types of private hospitals have higher quality than NHS providers.  
However, in the 2SLS model the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test rejects the null of the exogeneity 
of private hospital types (p = 0.0073) and the instruments are not weak according to the Stock 
and Yogo (2005) test based on a desired 2SLS maximal size set at 10% (the critical value 
with two endogenous regressors is 7.03). The 2SLS estimates of the effect of private FP and 
                                                 
24 We exclude HRG root BZ04 (Lens Capsulotomy) from this analysis as it was not offered in any private NFP 
site. In year 2013/14 there were 25 ISP organisations in total (19 FP, 6 NFP), treating planned NHS-funded 
patients.   The private FP and NFP organisations owned 157 and 32 hospital sites respectively.   
  Emergency 
Readmission 
Emergency 
Readmission 
   
 (1) (2)    
  OLS  2SLS    
Private non-TC -0.0091*** -0.0005       
 (-8.2160) (-0.1100)    
Private TC -0.0048*** 0.0042    
 (-5.8462) (1.5860)    
NHS TC -0.0014* 0.0184**    
 (-1.8482) (2.4730)    
1st stage choice of provider type     
   Private 
non-TC 
Private TC NHS TC 
dNHSnonTC  dPnonTC   0.0011*** -0.0007*** -0.0001*** 
   (7.1424) (-4.5836) (-3.2424) 
dNHSnonTC  dISTC   -0.0002* 0.0018*** -0.0001 
   (-1.9736) (8.5846) (-1.2166) 
dNHSnonTC  dNHS TC   -0.0001*** -0.0002*** 0.0003*** 
   (-6.1326) (-4.9433) (11.3331) 
R2 0.0303 0.0175 0.0387 0.0535 0.0300 
1st stage F-stat - private non-TC   20.77   
1st stage F-stat – private TC    35.73  
1st stage F-stat - NHS TC     85.66 
Endogeneity Test Chi2 stat.  8.74    
Endogeneity Test p-value   0.0330       
Wald Test p-value: private non-TC = private TC 0.0000 0.2950    
Wald Test p-value: private non-TC = NHSTC 0.0000 0.0207    
Wald Test p-value: private TC = NHS TC 0.0000 0.0526    
Wald Test p-value: private non-TC=ISTC=NHSTC=0 0.0000 0.0516    
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private FP status relative to public providers are not statistically significant.  Both OLS and 
2SLS models also imply that there is no difference in quality between private FP and private 
NFP hospitals.  
 
Table 6. Effect of ownership and for-profit status on emergency readmission 
probability. 
  
Emergency 
Readmission 
Emergency 
Readmission     
 
(1) (2) 
   OLS  2SLS     
Private Not For Profit  -0.0083*** -0.0004     
 
(-4.3489) (-0.0399) 
  Private For Profit  -0.0069*** 0.0034 
    (-7.7823) (1.3862)     
1st stage choice of provider type 
    
   
Private NFP   Private FP  
dNHS –dP_NFP 
  
-0.0002*** 0.0021*** 
   
(-4.0715) (7.2403) 
dNHS –dP_FP 
  
0.0002*** -0.0002*** 
      (5.1968) (-3.6787) 
Patients 3,773,129 3,773,129 3,773,129 3,773,129 
Number of HRGs 132 132 132 132 
R2 0.0303 0.0176 0.0752 0.0224 
1st stage F-stat – private NFP 
  
14.29 
 
1st stage F-stat – private FP  
   
26.22 
Endogeneity Test Chi2 stat. 
 
9.84 
  
Endogeneity Test p-value 
 
0.0073 
  
FP=NFP F-test p-value 0.3031 0.7168 
  
Notes. Models include 132 HRG effects. Covariates as in Table 2 columns (2) and (3).  dNHS = patient distance 
to nearest NHS hospital site, dP_NFP  patient distance to nearest private not-for-profit hospital site, dP_FP  patient 
distance to nearest private for-profit  hospital site. Distances are procedure specific.  t-stats in parenthesis based 
on cluster-robust standard errors at HRG level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
 
 
Table 7. Effect of ownership on quality, controlling for competition.  
 
Emergency 
Readmission 
Emergency 
Readmission 
 
(1) (2) 
 
OLS 2SLS  
Private Provider -0.0070*** 0.0026 
 
(-7.4502) (1.4589) 
Number of rival hospital sites within 30km -0.0000 0.0000 
 
(-0.7344) (0.2297) 
1st stage choice of provider type   
dNHS –dP 
 
0.0024*** 
  
(7.2000) 
Number of rival hospital sites within 30km  -0.0010*** 
  (-13.6974) 
Patients 3,784,683 3,784,683 
Number of HRGs 133 133 
R2 0.0303 0.0299 
1st stage F-stat 
 
51.84 
Endogeneity Test Chi2 stat. 
 
15.65 
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Endogeneity Test Chi2 stat. p-value 
 
0.0001 
Notes.  Same sample, other controls and HRG effects as in columns (2) and (3) of Table 2. In 2013/14, NHS and 
private hospitals had mean (sd) numbers of rival sites within 30km of 31 (30.5) and 23.6 (22.9). t-stats in 
parenthesis based on cluster-robust standard errors at HRG level; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
In Table 7 we report results from a robustness check in which we include a measure of 
market structure as a covariate to control for any potential effects of competition on quality.  
Including the market structure measure makes little difference: the direct effect of 
competition on quality is small and statistically insignificant in both the OLS and 2SLS 
models, and the OLS and 2SLS estimates of the effect of ownership are very similar to those 
in the preferred model in column (3) of Table 2.  
 
Table 8 reports results from five pairs of models estimated on dichotomous sub-samples.  
The left hand model in each panel is estimated on the sub-sample which we would expect to 
have a lower risk of emergency readmission and the right hand part on patients likely to have 
higher risk. 
 
We see that dichotomising the sample by low versus high morbidity (no versus some 
previous emergency admissions in panel a, no versus some comorbidities in panel b), does 
not change the results reported in Table 2. The OLS estimates of the effect of ownership are 
biased in favour of private providers but the 2SLS estimates show no significant effect.  In 
panel c the subsamples are defined by the income deprivation quintile of the patient’s small 
area of residence (least deprived quintile versus four most deprived quintiles). For patients in 
the least deprived quintile we can no longer reject the null that provider type is exogenous 
and so the OLS estimate is preferred.  For patients in the more deprived quintiles the 2SLS 
model is preferred.  Panel c implies that private providers have better quality relative to 
public providers for the least deprived patients and possibly worse quality for the most 
deprived. We get qualitatively similar results in panel d where the sample is dichotomised by 
age.  We cannot reject endogeneity of hospital type for younger patients. The OLS estimates 
for younger patients and the 2SLS estimates for older patients indicate that treatment in a 
private provider is better for younger patients and worse for older patients.   
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Table 8. Heterogeneity of ownership effect of based on observable patient’s 
characteristics.  
  
  Emergency 
Readmission 
Emergency 
Readmission 
Emergency 
Readmission 
Emergency 
Readmission 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
  OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
a. Effect of ownership by severity proxy (past emergency in the previous year) 
 
  Past Emergency Admission = 0 Past Emergency Admission > 0 
Private Provider   -0.0070*** 0.0013 -0.0090*** 0.0205 
    (-7.23) (0.64) (-6.30) (1.44) 
IV 1st stage choice of provider   
    dNHS - dISP   
 
0.0022*** 
 
0.0012*** 
 
  
 
(7.03) 
 
(6.22) 
Patients   3,202,451 3,202,451 582,232 582,232 
1st stage F-stat   
 
49.44 
 
38.67 
Endogeneity Test p-value     0.0021   0.0341 
b. Effect of ownership by comorbidies included in the Elixhauser index. 
 
  Elixhauser comorbidities = 0 Elixhauser comorbidities > 0 
Private Provider   -0.0055*** 0.0014 -0.0087*** 0.0044 
    (-6.94) (0.69) (-7.01) (1.35) 
IV 1st stage choice of provider           
dNHS - dISP   
 
0.0021*** 
 
0.0020*** 
 
  
 
(8.84) 
 
(4.72) 
Patients   2,161,662 2,161,662 1,623,021 1,623,021 
1st stage F-stat   
 
78.07 
 
22.23 
Endogeneity Test p-value     0.0035   0.0050 
c. Effect of ownership by Income Deprivation Quintiles  
 
  Least deprived quintile 4 most deprived quintiles 
Private Provider   -0.0065*** -0.0027 -0.0072*** 0.0043* 
    (-7.24) (-0.72) (-7.19) (1.80) 
IV 1st stage choice of provider   
    dNHS - dISP   
 
0.0030*** 
 
0.0019*** 
 
  
 
(7.47) 
 
(6.77) 
Patients   722,061 722,061 3,062,622 3,062,622 
1st stage F-stat   
 
55.79 
 
45.90 
Endogeneity Test p-value   
 
0.3480 
 
0.0004 
d Effect of ownership by Age  
 
  Age <= median age (59 years) Age > median age (59 years) 
Private Provider   -0.0073*** -0.0034 -0.0068*** 0.0095*** 
    (-7.96) (-1.24) (-5.28) (3.08) 
IV 1st stage choice of provider           
dNHS - dISP   
 
0.0021*** 
 
0.0020*** 
 
  
 
(8.22) 
 
(4.36) 
Patients   1,876,280 1,876,280 1,908,403 1,908,403 
1st stage F-stat   
 
67.50 
 
18.98 
Endogeneity Test p-value     0.1827   0.0009 
e. Effect of ownership – by HRG type (non-diagnostic vs diagnostic) 
 
  Diagnostic HRGs Non-diagnostic HRGs 
Private Provider   -0.0030*** -0.0044 -0.0079*** 0.0044** 
    (-4.03) (-0.71) (-7.08) (2.01) 
IV 1st stage choice of provider           
dNHS - dISP   
 
0.0022*** 
 
0.0020*** 
 
  
 
(14.15) 
 
(5.89) 
Patients   1,127,586 1,127,586 2,657,097 2,657,097 
1st stage F-stat   
 
200.11 
 
34.66 
Endogeneity Test p-value     0.8115   0.0003 
Notes. Controls for confounding as in Table 2. Number of HRGs is 133 for panels a to d, and in panel e 14 
HRGs are diagnostic and 119 are non-diagnostic. t-stats in parenthesis based on cluster-robust standard errors at 
HRGs level; *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Panel e dichotomises by type of HRG (diagnostic with a mean readmission rate of 1.88% vs 
non-diagnostic with a mean readmission rate of 2.17%). Again, like panels c and d, we 
cannot reject the null of exogeneity for the patients with a lower average readmission rate and 
private providers are better for the patients with diagnostic HRGs and worse for those with 
non-diagnostic HRGs.   
 
Notice that in all five dichotomisations the F statistic on the differential distance instrument is 
considerable smaller, though always statistically significant, in the models estimated on the 
right hand subsamples which have higher emergency readmission rates, suggesting that 
unobserved selection by providers is greater for these patients.25    
 
Table 9 reports results from a more detailed investigation of how the effect of ownership on 
quality differs by treatment type. We estimated separate models for each of the 15 HRGs with 
the largest number of patients treated in private hospitals.26  The 15 HRGs have 2,123,479 
patients, more than half of the full sample.  The results fall into three groups: 
 
(i) Five HRGs (Major & Intermediate Knee Procedures for Non-Trauma, 
Phacoemulsification Cataract Extraction and Lens Implant, Inguinal, Umbilical or Femoral 
Hernia Procedures, Major & Intermediate Hip Procedures for Non-Trauma and Minor Anal 
Procedures) for 688,872 patients have results similar to those for all procedures in Tables 2 
and 3. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests reject the null of exogenous choice of hospital and the 
first stage F-statistics on the differential distance instrument are very large. All models have 
have negative and statistically significant OLS coefficients for treatment in a private hospital 
but the 2SLS coefficients are positive and not statistically significant at the conventional 5% 
level.  
 
(ii) In four HRGs (Diagnostic Colonoscopy, Major Pain Procedures, Pain Radiofrequency 
Treatments, Diagnostic Flexible Cystoscopy) covering 525,297 patients the Durbin-Wu-
                                                 
25 While the results seem plausible, we cannot rule that partitioning the sample on patients’ characteristics 
introduces selection bias. They rest on the assumption that selection into private hospital is orthogonal to the 
way we partition the sample based on observed patients’ characteristics.   This assumption is reasonable for 
panel e (diagnostic vs non-diagnostic HRGs): since the models include HRG fixed effects which will allow for 
any effect of unobserved morbidity on the type of treatment.   It also seems plausible for panel d (below vs 
above median age) since unobserved morbidity will not affect patient age. 
26 Some HRGs for similar procedures (e.g. ‘Major & Intermediate Knee Procedures for Non-Trauma’ or 
‘Phacoemulsification Cataract Extraction and Lens Implant’) are bundled together.  
29 
 
Hausman tests do not reject the null of exogenous hospital type. There are statistically 
insignificant effects of ownership in both OLS and 2SLS specifications. 
 
(iii) Six HRGs (Diagnostic Endoscopic Upper Gastrointestinal Tract Procedures, Minor Hand 
Procedures for Non-Trauma, Major & Intermediate Shoulder  or Upper Arm Procedures for 
Non-Trauma, Diagnostic Flexible Sigmoidoscopy, Minor Skin Procedures, Intermediate Foot 
Procedures for Non-Trauma) covering 909,310 patients have negative and statistically 
significant effects of private ownership with OLS but statistically insignificant effects with 
2SLS.  However, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test does not reject the exogeneity of hospital 
ownership and so the OLS estimates are valid. For this set of HRGs patients treated in private 
hospitals have a lower probability of emergency readmissions.  
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Table 9. Effect of ownership on quality by procedure. 
    Private Providers   NHS  Providers   Effect of Private Ownership First stage 
Procedures HRG root 
codes 
Patients 28-day 
Emergency 
Readmission 
Rate 
 Patients 28-day 
Emergency 
Readmission 
Rate 
 
OLS 
estimate  (t-
stat) 
2SLS 
estimate (t-
stat) 
Endogeneity 
test            
(p-value) 
1st Stage 
F-stat 
Effect of IV on 
choice of private 
hospital 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
             Major & Intermediate Knee 
Procedures for Non-Trauma 
HB21, B22, 
HB23 
48,095 1.534%  144,892 2.989%  -0.0127***        
(-17.67) 
0.0043      
(0.74) 
8.6373***              
(0.00) 
6383.1 0.0065***                
(79.89) 
Phacoemulsification Cataract 
Extraction and Lens Implant 
BZ02, BZ03 38,862 0.952%  274,157 1.482%  -0.0033***              
(-5.55) 
0.0051*              
(1.72) 
8.2047***                    
(0.00) 
21584.6 0.0047***                      
(146.92) 
Inguinal, Umbilical or Femoral 
Hernia Procedures 
FZ18 17,030 1.491%  66,286 3.581%  -0.0174***              
(-14.63) 
0.0084      
(1.10) 
11.4934***                    
(0.00) 
4856.1 0.0065***                
(69.69) 
Major & Intermediate Hip 
Procedures for Non-Trauma 
HB11, HB12, 
HB13 
16,227 3.186%  54,097 4.475%  -0.0077***              
(-4.62) 
0.0154      
(1.42) 
4.6099***                    
(0.03) 
2521.1 0.0061***                
(50.21) 
Minor Anal Procedures FZ23 5,455 1.155%  23,771 2.238%  -0.0094***              
(-5.12) 
0.0187*             
(1.92) 
8.3899***                    
(0.00) 
1766.5 0.0071***                
(42.03) 
Diagnostic Colonoscopy FZ51, FZ52 16,871 0.984%  266,114 1.385%  -0.0008      
(-1.03) 
0.0033      
(0.40) 
0.2529      
(0.62) 
6572.8 0.0024***                
(81.07) 
Major Pain Procedures AB04 12,675 1.262%  87,246 1.474%  -0.0007      
(-0.62) 
0.0004      
(0.04) 
0.0138      
(0.91) 
1677.2 0.0029***                
(40.95) 
Pain Radiofrequency 
Treatments 
AB08 6,007 1.415%  13,290 1.467%  -0.0006      
(-0.30) 
-0.0045      
(-0.22) 
0.0366      
(0.85) 
169.0 0.0029***                
(13.00) 
Diagnostic Flexible Cystoscopy LB72 5,699 1.509%  117,395 2.141%  -0.0012      
(-0.72) 
0.0153      
(0.97) 
1.1217      
(0.29) 
3551.2 0.0017***                
(59.59) 
Diagnostic Endoscopic Upper 
Gastrointestinal Tract 
Procedures 
FZ61, FZ60 25,476 0.993%  418,758 2.127%  -0.0041***              
(-6.11) 
-0.0141*              
(-1.87) 
1.7909      
(0.18) 
11912.7 0.0023***                
(109.15) 
Minor Hand Procedures for 
Non-Trauma 
HB55, HB56 12,988 0.554%  60,978 0.987%  -0.0035***              
(-4.31) 
-0.0034      
(-0.66) 
0.0008      
(0.98) 
3957.4 0.0058***                
(62.91) 
Major & Intermediate Shoulder  
or Upper Arm Procedures for 
Non-Trauma 
HB61, HB62 11,160 0.824%  45,092 1.333%  -0.0043***              
(-4.15) 
-0.0068      
(-0.79) 
0.0820      
(0.77) 
2015.3 0.0060***                
(44.89) 
Diagnostic Flexible 
Sigmoidoscopy 
FZ54, FZ55 10,007 1.009%  158,579 1.764%  -0.0031***              
(-2.75) 
-0.0025      
(-0.21) 
0.0027      
(0.96) 
5008.4 0.0020***                
(70.77) 
Minor Skin Procedures JC43 9,596 0.573%  116,668 1.146%  -0.0045***              
(-4.82) 
0.0064      
(0.61) 
1.0772      
(0.30) 
3262.0 0.0023***                
(57.11) 
Intermediate Foot Procedures 
for Non-Trauma 
HB33, HB32 8,133 0.898%  31,875 1.785%  -0.0057***              
(-4.50) 
-0.0144      
(-1.42) 
0.7416      
(0.39) 
2300.1 0.0053***                
(47.96) 
Notes. Controls for confounding as in Table 1 (excluding HRG dummies). t-stats based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors; IV: patient distance to nearest NHS provider minus patient distance to nearest 
private provider. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 15 procedures with highest number of NHS patients in private providers.  
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5 Conclusions  
 
In the English NHS publicly funded patients have historically been treated almost entirely in 
public hospitals.  Recently private providers have been allowed to enter the market and to 
treat NHS patients. We use a treatment outcome – whether the patient subsequently had an 
emergency readmission within 28 days of discharge from their initial planned treatment – to 
compare quality for publicly funded patients in public and private hospitals. We have data on 
133 different planned treatments undergone by 3.8 million NHS funded patients in England 
between April 2013 and February 2014.  We find that, on average over all treatments studied, 
private hospitals and public hospitals provide similar quality of care once we include case-
mix and allow for unobserved selection into hospital type with an instrumental variable 
(difference in the distance to the nearest private and NHS hospitals).    Simple case-mix 
adjustment based on observed patient characteristics alone provides biased estimates of 
quality differences that suggest that private providers have higher quality for publicly funded 
patients than NHS providers.   
 
We also find no quality differences between public and private specialised and non-
specialised providers.  Nor does quality in private providers depend on whether they are for 
profit or not profit.  There are however statistically and economically significant differences 
in quality between public and private providers for specific types of care.  For example, 
public providers have higher quality overall for non-diagnostic treatments whilst private 
providers do better overall for diagnostic treatments.  We find no difference in quality 
between public and private providers for four of the five non-diagnostic treatments with the 
largest number of patients in private providers.  
 
Our analysis has two main policy implications. First, evaluating the opening of the market to 
private hospitals requires consideration of the effects on the quality of care for NHS patients 
as well as on waiting times and the cost to taxpayers who fund the NHS. Public and private 
providers are paid in the same way for the procedures we considered, so that there is no 
difference in the direct cost to the taxpayer.  We find that, on average, there is no difference 
between public and private providers in a major measure of quality (emergency readmission 
rates).   Hence evaluation of the policy needs to consider its effects on other aspects of 
quality, such as patient reported outcomes, and on patient waiting times. Second, emergency 
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readmissions are a common quality indicator. Our analysis suggests that casemix adjustment 
based on observable covariates is not sufficient to make readmission rates comparable across 
public and private providers, so that the lack of control for unobserved patient heterogeneity 
may bias the comparison across providers. Our study has demonstrated it is possible to 
correct for this. With appropriate methods policy makers can monitor quality even in the 
absence of complete information to adjust for casemix differences between public and private 
providers. 
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Appendix 
Table A1.  Numbers of sites and patients by hospital type. 
 Sites Patients 
NHS providers 393 3,407,820 
NHS non-treatment centres 387 3,359,963 
NHS treatment centres 6 47,857 
   
Private providers 190 376,863 
Private non-treatment centres 148 202,152 
Private treatment centres 42 174,711 
Private for profit  157 335,132 
Private not for profit  32 41,731 
Notes.  Providers are hospital sites.  Ownership and for profit status is attached to the organisation that owns the 
sites.   Numbers are from the estimation samples.  One HRG was dropped from the model with FP and NFP 
providers as it was not carried out in any NFP provider. 
 
Table A2. Volume and share of patients into NHS and private hospitals, by HRG4 root.  
HRG 4 
ROOTS 
HRG 4 name Total 
number 
of 
patients 
Volume 
in NHS 
hospitals 
Volume 
in ISP 
hospitals 
% ISP 
of total 
patients 
Number 
of NHS 
hospital 
sites  
Number 
of ISP 
hospital 
sites  
AA21 Minor Intracranial Procedures Except Trauma, with Other Diagnoses 8,006 7,775 231 2.89% 183 50 
AA26 Muscular, Balance, Cranial or Peripheral Nerve Disorders, Epilepsy or Head 
Injury 
23,572 23,395 177 0.75% 243 39 
AB03 Complex Pain Procedures 20,667 17,188 3,479 16.83% 210 82 
AB04 Major Pain Procedures 99,921 87,246 12,675 12.69% 241 112 
AB05 Intermediate Pain Procedures 21,750 19,156 2,594 11.93% 232 100 
AB06 Minor Pain Procedures 24,707 22,492 2,215 8.97% 253 140 
AB08 Pain Radiofrequency Treatments 19,297 13,290 6,007 31.13% 169 83 
AB09 Other Specified Pain Procedures 4,081 3,658 423 10.37% 181 56 
BZ01 Enhanced Cataract Surgery  7,941 7,565 376 4.73% 169 37 
BZ02 Phacoemulsification Cataract Extraction and Lens Implant 313,019 274,157 38,862 12.42% 202 101 
BZ04 Lens Capsulotomy with CC Score 0 11,554 10,505 1,049 9.08% 76 11 
BZ06 Intermediate Oculoplastics Procedures, 19 years and over 13,233 12,858 375 2.83% 240 47 
BZ07 Minor Oculoplastics Procedures, 19 years and over 41,570 40,139 1,431 3.44% 268 66 
BZ10 Minor Orbits or Lacrimal Procedures, 19 years and over 7,570 7,199 371 4.90% 192 25 
BZ23 Minor Vitreous Retinal Procedures 106,361 103,852 2,509 2.36% 169 12 
CA10 Septorhinoplasty, 19 years and over 4,452 4,066 386 8.67% 153 69 
CA11 Septoplasty, 19 years and over 14,472 12,588 1,884 13.02% 175 98 
CA14 Nasal Polypectomy 3,205 3,054 151 4.71% 158 60 
CA15 Excision or Biopsy, of Lesion of Internal Nose 2,431 2,293 138 5.68% 184 61 
CA16 Excision or Biopsy, of Lesion of External Nose 5,615 5,298 317 5.65% 246 45 
CA21 Very Major Nose Procedures 1,701 1,373 328 19.28% 159 53 
CA22 Major Nose Procedures 5,159 4,377 782 15.16% 174 85 
CA24 Minor Nose Procedures, 19 years and over 2,720 2,527 193 7.10% 182 68 
CA25 Minimal Nose Procedures, 19 years and over 2,281 2,124 157 6.88% 168 50 
CA28 Intermediate Sinus Procedures 7,239 6,293 946 13.07% 171 90 
CA32 Tympanoplasty, 19 years and over 6,725 6,425 300 4.46% 162 59 
CA34 Excision or Biopsy, of Lesion of External Ear, 19 years and over 7,503 7,063 440 5.86% 255 79 
CA35 Insertion of Grommets, between 2 and 18 years 21,958 21,435 523 2.38% 180 78 
CA36 Clearance of External Auditory Canal, 19 years and over 4,642 3,260 1,382 29.77% 167 32 
CA60 Tonsillectomy, 18 years and under 31,364 29,739 1,625 5.18% 163 95 
CA66 Excision or Biopsy, of Lesion of Mouth, 19 years and over 20,351 19,820 531 2.61% 253 62 
CA69 Diagnostic, Laryngoscopy or Pharyngoscopy, 19 years and over 11,113 9,349 1,764 15.87% 228 66 
CD01 Major Dental Procedures, 19 years and over 21,926 19,959 1,967 8.97% 172 23 
CD04 Major Surgical Removal of Tooth, 19 years and over 30,833 28,357 2,476 8.03% 173 26 
CD05 Surgical Removal of Tooth, 19 years and over 26,959 23,832 3,127 11.60% 190 28 
CD06 Extraction of Multiple Teeth, 18 years and under 49,742 48,728 1,014 2.04% 193 19 
CD07 Minor Extraction of Tooth, 19 years and over 12,095 11,645 450 3.72% 183 16 
FZ13 Minor Therapeutic or Diagnostic, General Abdominal Procedures, 19 years and 
over 
11,111 10,583 528 4.75% 237 92 
FZ17 Abdominal Hernia Procedures, 19 years and over 12,353 10,778 1,575 12.75% 248 144 
FZ18 Inguinal, Umbilical or Femoral Hernia Procedures, 19 years and over 83,316 66,286 17,030 20.44% 261 155 
FZ21 Major Anal Procedures, 19 years and over 7,134 6,497 637 8.93% 236 93 
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FZ22 Intermediate Anal Procedures, 19 years and over, 32,049 28,082 3,967 12.38% 251 114 
FZ23 Minor Anal Procedures, 19 years and over 29,226 23,771 5,455 18.66% 253 115 
FZ50 Intermediate Large Intestine Procedures, 19 years and over 7,533 7,246 287 3.81% 235 73 
FZ51 Diagnostic Colonoscopy, 19 years and over 147,485 138,095 9,390 6.37% 240 120 
FZ52 Diagnostic Colonoscopy with Biopsy, 19 years and over 135,500 128,019 7,481 5.52% 241 118 
FZ53 Therapeutic Colonoscopy, 19 years and over 98,725 94,869 3,856 3.91% 235 110 
FZ54 Diagnostic Flexible Sigmoidoscopy, 19 years and over 116,082 108,204 7,878 6.79% 249 115 
FZ55 Diagnostic Flexible Sigmoidoscopy with Biopsy, 19 years and over 52,504 50,375 2,129 4.05% 241 104 
FZ56 Therapeutic Flexible Sigmoidoscopy, 19 years and over 19,672 18,820 852 4.33% 238 91 
FZ60 Diagnostic Endoscopic Upper Gastrointestinal Tract Procedures, 19 years and 
over 
141,462 133,200 8,262 5.84% 246 113 
FZ61 Diagnostic Endoscopic Upper Gastrointestinal Tract Procedures with Biopsy, 19 
years and over 
302,772 285,558 17,214 5.69% 245 115 
FZ63 Combined Upper and Lower Gastrointestinal Tract Diagnostic Endoscopic 
Procedures 
5,730 5,514 216 3.77% 226 60 
FZ64 Combined Upper and Lower Gastrointestinal Tract Diagnostic Endoscopic 
Procedures with Biopsy, 19 years and over 
44,902 43,711 1,191 2.65% 237 99 
FZ65 Combined Upper and Lower Gastrointestinal Tract Therapeutic Endoscopic 
Procedures 
9,335 9,155 180 1.93% 230 55 
FZ70 Therapeutic Endoscopic Upper Gastrointestinal Tract Procedures, 19 years and 
over 
12,997 12,803 194 1.49% 221 47 
FZ76 Distal Colon Procedures, 19 years and over,  1,739 1,547 192 11.04% 195 46 
FZ91 Non-Malignant Gastrointestinal Tract Disorders with Single Intervention,  15,724 15,550 174 1.11% 263 53 
GA10 Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy, 19 years and over 57,679 52,461 5,218 9.05% 222 103 
HB11 Major Hip Procedures for Non-Trauma, Category 2 13,698 11,100 2,598 18.97% 211 128 
HB12 Major Hip Procedures for Non-Trauma, Category 1 54,815 41,405 13,410 24.46% 228 150 
HB13 Intermediate Hip Procedures for Non-Trauma, Category 2 1,811 1,592 219 12.09% 168 61 
HB14 Intermediate Hip Procedures for Non-Trauma, Category 1 6,489 5,675 814 12.54% 226 98 
HB15 Minor Hip Procedures for Non-Trauma, Category 2, 19 years and over 6,431 5,724 707 10.99% 235 106 
HB19 Minimal Hip Procedures for Non-Trauma 20,353 17,333 3,020 14.84% 241 142 
HB21 Major Knee Procedures for Non-Trauma, Category 2 74,297 57,129 17,168 23.11% 232 153 
HB22 Major Knee Procedures for Non-Trauma, Category 1 45,379 30,722 14,657 32.30% 251 165 
HB23 Intermediate Knee Procedures for Non-Trauma 73,311 57,041 16,270 22.19% 257 167 
HB24 Minor Knee Procedures for Non-Trauma, Category 2 13,956 12,536 1,420 10.17% 255 147 
HB25 Minor Knee Procedures for Non-Trauma, Category 1, 19 years and over 7,567 7,052 515 6.81% 242 131 
HB29 Minimal Knee Procedures for Non-Trauma 11,182 8,898 2,284 20.43% 226 112 
HB31 Major Foot Procedures for Non-Trauma 8,705 6,966 1,739 19.98% 222 125 
HB32 Intermediate Foot Procedures for Non-Trauma, Category 2, 19 years and over 19,638 15,552 4,086 20.81% 243 135 
HB33 Intermediate Foot Procedures for Non-Trauma, Category 1, 19 years and over 20,370 16,323 4,047 19.87% 247 141 
HB34 Minor Foot Procedures for Non-Trauma, Category 2, 18 years and under 27,822 23,855 3,967 14.26% 244 145 
HB35 Minor Foot Procedures for Non-Trauma, Category 1 6,214 5,175 1,039 16.72% 244 126 
HB39 Minimal Foot Procedures for Non-Trauma 12,315 10,459 1,856 15.07% 224 106 
HB51 Major Hand Procedures for Non-Trauma, Category 2 8,980 7,304 1,676 18.66% 227 118 
HB53 Intermediate Hand Procedures for Non-Trauma, Category 2 9,373 7,944 1,429 15.25% 236 128 
HB54 Intermediate Hand Procedures for Non-Trauma, Category 1 15,143 13,110 2,033 13.43% 258 145 
HB55 Minor Hand Procedures for Non-Trauma, Category 2 73,966 60,978 12,988 17.56% 269 161 
HB59 Minimal Hand Procedures for Non-Trauma 9,862 8,506 1,356 13.75% 218 101 
HB61 Major, Shoulder or Upper Arm Procedures for Non-Trauma 34,613 27,296 7,317 21.14% 238 142 
HB62 Intermediate, Shoulder or Upper Arm Procedures for Non-Trauma 21,639 17,796 3,843 17.76% 245 139 
HB63 Minor, Shoulder or Upper Arm Procedures for Non-Trauma 9,623 8,164 1,459 15.16% 252 144 
HB69 Minimal, Shoulder or Upper Arm Procedures for Non-Trauma 8,185 6,414 1,771 21.64% 182 89 
HB71 Major, Elbow or Lower Arm Procedures for Non-Trauma 2,050 1,858 192 9.37% 206 65 
HB72 Intermediate, Elbow or Lower Arm Procedures for Non-Trauma 6,174 5,610 564 9.14% 241 112 
HB73 Minor, Elbow or Lower Arm Procedures for Non-Trauma 7,287 6,254 1,033 14.18% 238 125 
HB99 Other Procedures for Non-Trauma 8,560 8,013 547 6.39% 265 98 
HC04 Extradural Spine Intermediate 1  16,362 13,429 2,933 17.93% 152 81 
HC05 Extradural Spine Minor 2  3,519 3,050 469 13.33% 200 69 
HC06 Extradural Spine Minor 1 4,908 4,041 867 17.67% 204 82 
HC26 Scoliosis or Other Spinal Deformity 1,726 1,579 147 8.52% 175 48 
HC27 Degenerative Spinal Conditions  34,633 29,960 4,673 13.49% 243 100 
HC32 Low Back Pain  2,128 1,982 146 6.86% 178 39 
HD21 Soft Tissue Disorders  8,272 7,645 627 7.58% 236 84 
HR07 Orthopaedic Reconstruction with Intervention Score 43 or less, with Diagnosis 
Score 61 or more 
13,648 12,407 1,241 9.09% 241 136 
HR08 Orthopaedic Reconstruction with Intervention Score 44-65, with Diagnosis Score 
23-60 
11,877 9,599 2,278 19.18% 233 126 
HR09 Orthopaedic Reconstruction with Intervention Score 66 or more, with Diagnosis 
Score 23-60 
2,757 2,356 401 14.54% 208 83 
JC42 Intermediate Skin Procedures, 13 years and over 28,524 27,738 786 2.76% 290 124 
JC43 Minor Skin Procedures, 13 years and over 126,264 116,668 9,596 7.60% 316 161 
KA09 Thyroid Procedures with CC Score 4+ 8,784 8,653 131 1.49% 181 36 
LB09 Intermediate Endoscopic Ureter Procedures, 19 years and over 15,401 15,049 352 2.29% 219 62 
LB14 Intermediate Endoscopic Bladder Procedures 23,972 23,216 756 3.15% 237 90 
LB15 Minor Bladder Procedures, 19 years and over 21,580 20,996 584 2.71% 231 82 
LB17 Introduction of Therapeutic Substance into Bladder 12,473 12,103 370 2.97% 136 13 
LB25 Transurethral Prostate Resection Procedures  16,829 15,642 1,187 7.05% 171 90 
LB26 Intermediate Endoscopic, Prostate or Bladder Neck Procedures (Male and Female) 2,330 2,166 164 7.04% 186 49 
LB27 Minor Endoscopic, Prostate or Bladder Neck Procedures (Male) 16,664 16,235 429 2.57% 184 49 
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LB33 Vasectomy Procedures 7,397 4,998 2,399 32.43% 187 52 
LB36 Extracorporeal Lithotripsy 21,329 21,097 232 1.09% 122 9 
LB51 Vaginal Tape Operations for Urinary Incontinence,  8,299 7,599 700 8.43% 197 78 
LB54 Minor, Scrotum, Testis or Vas Deferens Procedures, 19 years and over 15,086 13,431 1,655 10.97% 259 116 
LB55 Minor or Intermediate, Urethra Procedures, 19 years and over 16,873 15,149 1,724 10.22% 249 107 
LB56 Minor Penis Procedures, between 2 and 18 years 29,092 26,304 2,788 9.58% 254 109 
LB72 Diagnostic Flexible Cystoscopy, 19 years and over 123,094 117,395 5,699 4.63% 250 107 
MA04 Intermediate Open Lower Genital Tract Procedures  9,755 8,427 1,328 13.61% 205 102 
MA07 Major Open Upper Genital Tract Procedures  24,656 21,794 2,862 11.61% 196 110 
MA08 Major, Laparoscopic or Endoscopic, Upper Genital Tract Procedures,  11,368 10,572 796 7.00% 194 98 
MA10 Minor, Laparoscopic or Endoscopic, Upper Genital Tract Procedures 14,981 13,269 1,712 11.43% 213 107 
MA12 Resection or Ablation Procedures for Intra-Uterine Lesions 34,700 30,982 3,718 10.71% 213 117 
MA22 Minor Lower Genital Tract Procedures 9,552 8,226 1,326 13.88% 237 117 
MA23 Minimal Lower Genital Tract Procedures 16,267 15,334 933 5.74% 233 100 
MA30 Intermediate Female Pelvic Peritoneum Adhesion Procedures 6,505 5,384 1,121 17.23% 211 102 
MA31 Diagnostic Hysteroscopy 7,587 6,788 799 10.53% 214 100 
MA32 Diagnostic Hysteroscopy with Biopsy 20,410 18,490 1,920 9.41% 215 104 
MA33 Diagnostic Hysteroscopy with Biopsy and Implantation of Intrauterine Device 7,834 6,669 1,165 14.87% 207 100 
MA35 Implantation of Intrauterine Device 2,632 2,361 271 10.30% 198 67 
YQ16 Open Treatment of Primary Unilateral Varicose Veins 7,126 6,127 999 14.02% 202 43 
YR30 Percutaneous Transluminal, Laser or Radiofrequency Ablation, of Bilateral 
Varicose Veins 
1,520 1,415 105 6.91% 105 16 
YR31 Percutaneous Transluminal, Laser or Radiofrequency Ablation, of Unilateral 
Varicose Veins 
9,527 8,929 598 6.28% 122 23 
YR33 Sclerotherapy of Unilateral Varicose Veins 3,869 3,578 291 7.52% 114 17 
 
Table A3. Correlation of differential distance IV and patient’s severity covariates.  
  
Emergency admissions during 
previous year 
Elixhauser Index 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
IV: dNHS - dP 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0006 
 
(0.8400) (-0.0134) (0.4323) (1.6093) 
(dNHS - dP)^2 
 
-0.0000 
 
0.0000* 
  
(-0.6586) 
 
(1.8135) 
     distance to first NHS non TC -0.0008*** -0.0008*** -0.0011*** -0.0013*** 
 
(-6.9502) (-6.4210) (-3.4027) (-3.6793) 
GP QOF achievement score -0.0009*** -0.0009*** 0.0017*** 0.0017*** 
 
(-5.5690) (-5.5723) (6.1115) (6.0647) 
Rural patient -0.0105*** -0.0107*** -0.0032 -0.0018 
 
(-5.5531) (-5.7364) (-0.7090) (-0.3769) 
Daycase patient -0.0914*** -0.0914*** -0.1868*** -0.1865*** 
 
(-8.9967) (-8.9948) (-11.3507) (-11.3556) 
Female patient -0.0143** -0.0143** 0.0072 0.0072 
 
(-2.0638) (-2.0638) (0.7477) (0.7483) 
Patient age -0.0006** -0.0006** 0.0147*** 0.0147*** 
 
(-1.9984) (-1.9977) (23.6303) (23.6432) 
Number of Elixhauser co-
morbidities 
0.0920*** 0.0920*** 
  
 
(13.8702) (13.8699) 
  IMD 2010 income score 0.2687*** 0.2688*** 0.6761*** 0.6753*** 
 
(12.7796) (12.7935) (17.0780) (17.0029) 
Number of Emergency 
admissions previous year 
  
0.1441*** 0.1441*** 
   
(25.5576) (25.5588) 
constant 0.3236*** 0.3233*** -0.2505*** -0.2475*** 
 
(15.5797) (15.5015) (-5.4950) (-5.2486) 
     Patients 3784683 3784683 3784683 3784683 
HRGs 133 133 133 133 
R^2 0.0609 0.0609 0.1451 0.1451 
AIC 8165778.2 8165777.6 9867036. 9866858.6 
BIC 8165896.5 8165909.1 9867154.9 9866990.1 
AIC linear - AIC quadratic 0.6 177.4 
BIC linear - BIC quadratic -12.6 164.8 
Notes. dNHS: patient distance to nearest NHS hospital. dP: patient distance to nearest private provider. Distances computed to 
generate the instrumental variables are procedure specific. t-stats in parenthesis based on cluster-robust standard errors at 
HRG level; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table A4. Covariate-adjusted difference in means t-test for main confounders.  
(A) (B) (C) (D = C-B) (E) (F) (G) 
 Confounder 
Mean of (A) 
confounder if 
dNHS,j - dP,j  <= 
mean(dNHS,j - dP,j)  
Mean of (A) 
confounder if 
dNHS,j - dP,j  > 
mean(dNHS,j - dP,j) 
Difference: 
Means 
Difference: 
Covariate 
Adjusted 
Means 
t-statistic 
for column 
E 
p-value for 
t-statistic 
Past 
Emergency 
Admissions 
0.2302 0.2331 0.0029 -0.0005 -0.1559 0.8764 
Elixhauser 
Index 
0.6703 0.6859 0.0156 0.017 2.6066 0.0102 
Income 
deprivation 
0.143 0.1477 0.0047 0.0012 1.0719 0.2857 
Patient Age 56.3727 55.8013 -0.5714 -0.4637 -1.8036 0.0736 
Notes. The conditional means of the four confounding variables are adjusted using linear regression models with HRGs fixed 
effects as in Eq. (6) but having the either one of the four listed covariates as outcome variable. The regression model used to 
compute the adjusted means of the two subgroups is the same as the one in Table A3, except for the absence of the IV terms, 
which are replaced by a binary indicator for whether the differential distance dNHS,j - dP,j  for a given patient is smaller or 
greater than its mean (by HRG4 root). Sample sizes are 1,194,314 and  2,590,369 respectively for (B) and (C).  
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Table A5.  Effect of ownership on emergency readmission probability: full results.  
  OLS IV First Stage 2SLS 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
  
Emergency 
Readmission 
Private Provider Emergency 
Readmission 
Private Provider -0.0070***   0.0028 
 
(-7.3660) 
 
(1.2956) 
dNHS  dP 
 
0.0021*** 
     (6.9783)   
dNHSnonTC -0.0001*** 0.0011*** -0.0001*** 
 
(-3.1627) (5.4195) (-3.7077) 
GP QOF quality -0.0001*** 0.0004*** -0.0001*** 
 
(-3.0940) (3.3683) (-3.2361) 
Patient living in rural area (LSOA) -0.0005** 0.0061*** -0.0004** 
 
(-2.2877) (2.6520) (-2.0341) 
Daycase patient -0.0102*** -0.0896*** -0.0093*** 
 
(-9.9675) (-5.5145) (-8.7418) 
Female patient -0.0013*** 0.0030** -0.0013*** 
 
(-3.3644) (2.0061) (-3.4212) 
Patient aged 0-19 years -0.0025 -0.0882*** -0.0017 
 
(-0.8906) (-7.8309) (-0.5977) 
Patient aged 20-39 years 0.0027** 0.0214*** 0.0024** 
 
(2.3042) (3.2166) (2.1408) 
Patient aged 40-59 years -0.0011** 0.0186*** -0.0012*** 
 
(-2.3590) (5.7898) (-2.9206) 
Patient aged over 80 years 0.0103*** -0.0186*** 0.0105*** 
 
(7.1923) (-6.0605) (7.2460) 
N. past year emergency admissions 0.0242*** -0.0156*** 0.0243*** 
 
(35.7515) (-10.7951) (36.5689) 
Number of Elixhauser co-morbidities  0.0042*** -0.0039 0.0043*** 
 
(16.2827) (-1.4704) (16.7363) 
IMD income deprivation score  0.0109*** -0.1325*** 0.0122*** 
 
(9.2000) (-12.4959) (9.3523) 
Constant 0.0375*** 0.1063*** 0.0368*** 
  (21.5176) (4.6885) (22.0259) 
HRGs Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Statistics       
Patients 3784683 3784683 3784683 
HRGs 133 133 133 
R2 0.0303 0.0819 0.0299 
1st stage F-stat 
  
48.6961 
1st stage F-stat p-value 
  
0.0000 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Endogeneity Test Chi^2 
  
10.9500 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Endogeneity Test p-value     0.0009 
Notes. All models include 133 HRGs and; dNHSnonTC: distance from the centroid of patient’s residence LSOA 
to the closest general NHS hospital. dNHS: patient distance to nearest NHS hospital. dP: patient distance to 
nearest private provider. Distances computed to generate the instrumental variables are procedure specific. t-
stats in parenthesis based on cluster-robust standard errors at HRG level; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table A6. Effect of ownership and specialization on emergency readmission probability. 
  
Emergency 
Readmission 
Emergency 
Readmission 
    
 
(1) (2) 
   OLS  2SLS     
Private non-TC -0.0091*** 0.0022 
  
 
(-8.2411) (0.4928) 
  Private TC -0.0047*** 0.0058** 
    (-5.8639) (2.1076)     
1st stage choice of provider type 
    
   
Private non-TC Private TC 
dNHS –dPnonTC 
  
0.0010*** -0.0008*** 
   
(6.7730) (-5.2629) 
dNHS –dISTC 
  
-0.0002*** 0.0017*** 
      (-2.6916) (8.8357) 
Patients 3784683 3784683 3784683 3784683 
Number of HRGs 133 133 133 133 
R2 0.0303 0.0374 0.0507 0.0175 
1st stage F-stat – Private non-TC 
  
30.3505 
 
1st stage F-stat – ISTC 
   
53.7565 
Endogeneity Test Chi2 stat. 
   
8.6401 
Endogeneity Test p-value 
   
0.0133 
Wald Test p-value: Private non-TC = ISTC  0.0000 0.3996   
Wald Test p-value: Private non-TC = ISTC = 0 0.0000 0.0991   
Notes. Controls for confounding as in Table 4.  TC: treatment centre. dNHS = patient distance to nearest NHS 
hospital site, dPnonTC =  patient distance to nearest private non TC, dISTC = patient distance to nearest private TC 
hospital site.  t-stats in parenthesis based on cluster-robust standard errors at HRG level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. 
